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When Susan’s 1971 and 1972 personal 
canceled checks were accidentally 
destroyed, she needlessly worried about 
what she would do if she ever needed 
them. She was unaware that the bank 
had microfilmed both sides of the 
checks before they were returned to her. 
For a nominal fee she could get a copy of 
any transaction in her bank account. 
Banks keep such records for a period of 
five years.
If Susan can request and get copies of 
her bank transactions, can others also 
get such information? They surely can. 
Do others need Susan’s approval for 
access to such highly personal infor­
mation? They do not! The courts have 
ruled that the information is part of the 
records of the bank. They have in effect 
said that by the use of bank checks we 
have opened up the details of our private 
lives to unknown investigators. Since 
the records are the property of the bank, 
Susan has no control over their use. The 
Internal Revenue Service and other 
governmental agencies have access to 
this information through the use of ad­
ministrative subpoena.
An administrative subpoena can be 
issued by certain governmental agencies 
without any court action or any 
notification to the individual. In fact, 
such subpoenas are used to obtain 
records on entire groups of people. A 
major airline was asked for a list of all 
persons making pilgrimages to one of 
the gambling centers. The Government 
was merely fishing for unreported 
gambling winnings.
Because of its computer a bank in a 
major city even knew which of its 
customers paid a hooker the previous 
night.1 The bank had installed one of the 
outdoor machines that allowed 
customers to withdraw money at any 
hour of the day or night. The computer 
records the time that the transaction oc­
curred as well as the amount. The bank, 
alarmed to discover a strange flurry of 
withdrawals between midnight and 
two a.m., feared it was getting ripped 
off. Investigators discovered that the 
bank was “convenient to a red-light dis­
trict,” and that customers were stopping 
for cash en route. On another front, an 
official in an Eastern city was astounded 
to be shown a photostat of his check 
written to a lady of the night for services 
rendered. The massage parlor was the 
subject of the investigation - not the city 
official.
Information stored on numerous 
magnetic tapes can invade the privacy of 
every American. All that is needed in 
many instances is the entering of a social 
security number into an access terminal. 
The thought of the unraveling of life 
histories for indiscriminate purposes 
has generated vast unease among a wary 
public.
Many are also rightfully concerned 
about the validity of some personal in­
formation in dozens of different com­
puter files and the improper use of even 
the valid information. In the midst of 
potential abuse, what steps have been 
taken to (1) curtail the collection of this 
data, (2) insure the validity of the data, 
and (3) control the use of the stored 
data? The balance of the article ex­
amines some of the governmental and 
private efforts to meet the brewing 
problems. The following are discussed: 
The Privacy Act of 1974, The Commis­
sion on Privacy, various state laws, and 
activities of private agencies such as the 
AICPA and the Data Processing 
Management Association.
Past and Pending Legislation
The Privacy Act of 1974 (Public Law 
93-579) poses challenges to data 
processing executives in U.S. Federal 
agencies. One challenge comes from the 
meanings of the words “relevance,” 
“integrity,” “accuracy” and “security.” 
This same challenge and others will 
probably confront the remaining public 
and private sectors in the U.S. in the 
next few years. The 1974 Act only 
applied to federal agencies, but legisla­
tion is being introduced at both federal 
and state levels that would extend 
similar provisions to all public agencies 
and private concerns. One formidable 
challenge that will meet private users is 
that of formulating feasible plans to 
meet not only the problems already fac­
ed by federal agencies, but also, and 
possibly the greater challenge, problems 
in the area of cost-benefits.
The Privacy Act provided for a 
Privacy Protection Commission. The 
members of this commission were ap­
pointed in 1975 and will address the 
question of whether “privacy” legisla-
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Information stored on 
numerous magnetic tapes can 
invade the privacy of every 
American.
tion should be passed to restrict the use 
and collection of personal information 
by businesses. This commission expires 
in June, 1977.
The Department of Commerce is 
gathering information through a survey 
designed to determine where possible 
problems exist and whether the legisla­
tion should be extended to private con­
cerns. Its questionnaire seeks to fill the 
information void with regard to the 
cost-benefit ratio, the disruption of es­
tablished business practices, and the 
possible adverse effects on consumer ser­
vices. This survey should provide infor­
mation to Congress for use in further 
privacy legislation.2
The Fair Credit Reporting Act is the 
principal Act of Congress affecting the 
private sector’s collection and use of 
personal information. Representatives 
Koch and Goldwater introduced a bill in 
the 94th Congress, HR 1984, that would 
broaden and expand the provisions of 
the Privacy Act to cover private 
businesses, state, and local 
governments. HR 1984 sought to extend 
to the private sector laws controlling the 
use of computer data concerning private 
citizens. It was “a strict, tough” bill 
patterned after the Privacy Act of 1974. 
It covered all manual and automated 
data systems which “describe, locate, or 
index anything about an individual, 
regardless of whether the system is 
private or public.”
After the introduction of the Koch- 
Goldwater bill, DPMA (Data Process­
ing Management Association) spon­
sored a symposium on the Impact of 
Privacy Legislation in Washington in 
May of 1975. Feedback indicated that 
implementing the act in the form of its 
introduction would be “over- 
burdensome, not cost effective, and 
almost too obtrusive to the point of 
becoming detrimental not only to 
business but to the consumer himself.”3 
The bill was not passed by the 94th Con­
gress, but the sponsors hope for enact­
ment of a similar measure in the present 
session of Congress and believe that the 
essential points will eventually become 
law. However, it appears that Congress 
will not act until after the privacy com­
mission makes its report in 1977.
Other proposed federal legislation 
(drafted by a House Judiciary subcom­
mittee) includes a new privacy protec­
tion bill covering police departments 
and similar data banks. One section of 
the proposed bill is devoted to “secon­
dary use.” It limits what can be done by 
organizations and individuals with 
dossier data they obtained from law en­
forcement agencies. Previous bills 
attempted to control secondary use only 
by limiting access to data bank files.
Various bills are appearing in state 
legislatures. Data Management (April, 
1976) reports the introduction of such 
legislation in California and Minnesota. 
S.B. No. 99 was passed in the regular 
session of the 111th General Assembly 
of the State of Ohio and became law on 
July 21, 1976. This bill “regulates the use 
of personal information by state and 
local governments and requires 
governmental and private computer 
systems to give public notice of its ex­
istence, to protect the privacy of in­
dividuals from excessive record keeping 
by government.” More than 125 bills to 
protect privacy are pending in various 
legislative bodies.4 Since the thrust of 
this paper concerns problems arising 
from Privacy Acts, only the provisions 
of the federal act will be discussed. This 
decision arises from the belief that 
future acts will probably contain similar 
provisions, but would extend to all 
governmental agencies and private sec­
tor concerns.
Quotes From the Privacy Act of 19745 
1. The opportunities for an individual 
to secure employment, insurance, 
and credit, and his right to due 
process and other legal protections 
are endangered by the misuse of cer­
tain information systems (preamble).
2. Federal agencies (will).. . be subject 
to civil suit for any damages which 
occur as a result of willful or inten­
tional action which violates any in­
dividual’s rights under this Act 
(preamble).
3. Each agency... shall... establish ap­
propriate administrative, technical, 
and physical safeguards to insure the 
security and confidentiality of 
records and to protect against any 
anticipated threats or hazards to 
their security or integrity which 
could result in substantial harm, em­
barrassment, inconvenience, or un­
fairness to any individual on whom 
information is maintained.
4. Whenever any agency . . . fails to 
maintain any record concerning an 
individual with such accuracy, 
relevance, timeliness, and com­
pleteness as is necessary to insure 
fairness in any determination 
relating to the qualifications, 
character, rights, or opportunities of, 
or benefits to the individual that may 
be made on the basis of such record, 
and consequently a determination is 
made which is adverse to the in­
dividual . .. the individual may bring 
a civil action against the agency, and 
the district courts of the United 
States shall have jurisdiction.
The message of these quotes must 
become a concern of data processing 
managers. Agencies of the U.S. Govern­
ment are responsible for the integrity 
and security of the personal data in their 
files. The author predicts that similar 
laws will be drafted and enacted that will 
extend privacy legislation to state and 
local government units and to all private 
organizations. Thus, the challenge of 
meeting the integrity and security re­
quirements is here for all data managers.
Integrity and Accuracy of Data
Writing in the April, 1976 EDP 
Analyzer, Richard G. Canning dis­
tinguished between the integrity and the 
accuracy of data. He used accuracy to 
mean “conforming exactly to the truth: 
and integrity to mean “the data system 
does not inject error into the system.” 
Thus, the two words together would 
mean that the data is “undistorted by 
error.” However, if erroneous data is 
entered into the system, the system can­
not correct this, but acts with integrity if 
it does not inject more error into the 
data. Thus, the burden is on the 
organization to see that erroneous per­
sonal data never enters the system. To 
insure the integrity of the data the injec­
tion of error must be inhibited during 
the initial recording, transmission, 
processing and storage, as well as during 
the recovery process.
Errors can never be completely 
eliminated; each organization must find 
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its own error tolerance level. The big 
question is whether the tolerance level 
that is acceptable for operations is good 
enough to meet the demands of privacy 
for personal data. Errors made in finan­
cial data may be easily corrected; 
seldom are the reputations of in­
dividuals personally affected by such 
errors. Granted, persons may make 
financial investments of erroneous data 
and be monetarily hurt, but such losses 
can be compensated by damage awards. 
Erroneous information or the misuse of 
personal data puts an organization in an 
entirely different game; one that is 
played by entirely different rules. Even 
the rule makers are different: in the 
financial information area the Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) is the 
principal regulator; the proposed 
national legislation would probably be 
regulated by a Privacy Commission; the 
Fair Credit Reporting Act by the 
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and 
the proposed legislation covering the 
“secondary use” of information in data 
banks by the Justice Department.
Improving Data Integrity
The first step in improving data in­
tegrity might be to develop definitions 
for personal data. There are not any 
nationally accepted definitions as yet. 
Such definitions must be developed 
before national standards can be 
developed or applied. Such definitions 
should include the characteristics of ac­
curacy, relevance, completeness, 
timeliness, and verifiability. Once 
definitions are developed, a next step 
might be to review and possibly redesign 
the forms and procedures for collecting 
data. If some piece of data is not rele­
vant, its collection should be dropped. 
Outdated information should be 
deleted. For the protection of the 
organization, information that cannot 
be independently verified should be 
deleted. The entire process of data entry 
should be reviewed to improve the 
detection and correction of erroneous 
items, and to prevent their reentry into 
the system. The internal control system 
used for such data should be reviewed 
on a regular basis.
The FTC served notice that it would 
question data collection procedures 
when it filed a formal complaint in 
February, 1974, against the Retail 
Credit Company.6 The complaint ac­
cused Retail Credit of such violations as 
setting daily work loads so high that in­
vestigators had to falsify information to 
meet quotas and required investigators 
to file a percentage of derogatory 
reports to impress its customers. Also 
questioned was the problem of disclos­
ing the sources of information that 
entered the files. Disclosure of the 
sources of information is not presently 
required. Retail Credit insisted that the 
required disclosure of information 
sources would “seriously” impair the 
company’s investigations. Retail 
Credit’s problem areas were in 
preemployment and insurance in­
vestigations. Unlike the credit reports, 
where much of the information is 
available in public records, preemploy­
ment and insurance investigations in­
volve contacting an individual’s 
neighbors and business associates to ask 
questions about the subject’s life-style, 
financial and marital situation, and 
drinking habits. Critics insist that peo­
ple should have the right to see these 
files to correct what Ralph Nader called 
“backyard gossip.”
The question of the accuracy and in­
tegrity of computer programs must be 
considered, as well as the data itself. In a 
multi-programming job stream one 
program can change another program, 
and another program can change the 
data. Thus, a number of things should 
be reviewed concerning the way that 
personal data is stored and handled. 
One suggestion is that “dedicated equip­
ment” might be used for particularly 
sensitive applications, both for security 
and integrity. The feasibility of such an 
approach might be questioned since it 
might play havoc with integrated 
systems.
The problems of the real quality and 
relevance of data are separate from that 
of systems errors. The quality of data is 
measured by its accuracy, relevance, 
and precision. Data might be accurate 
but not relevant to the decision, or not 
relevant for multiple purpose use. Preci­
sion is an indicator of the repeatability 
of the measurements used in the deter­
mination of accuracy. It is the consisten­
cy (or lack of it) of one method of 
measurement repeated numerous times. 
“Precisions is affected by what is under 
the control of the decision maker - his 
operations of measurement transcrib­
ing, values of attributes, and the stabili­
ty of his processes.”7 Thus, the precision 
of information may differ between in­
vestigators due to different attitudes and 
procedures. This is usually referred to as 
interviewer bias. This lack of precision 
between investigators has no doubt add­
ed to the problems of credit reporting 
agencies. Canning restates the accuracy 
provision in the following way:8
the challenge of meeting the 
integrity and security re­
quirements is here for all data 
managers
Collect information from a variety of in­
dependent sources, including the data sub­
ject, when the information may result in 
adverse determinations about the in­
dividual’s rights, benefits, and privileges. 
Moreover, these sources should be chosen 
on the basis of most likely disagreement. 
Then indicate the estimates of accuracy and 
precision for each data item recorded about 
the individual.
Security of Data
Data security is the safety of data 
from accidental and/or intentional but 
unauthorized disclosure, modification, 
destruction, or theft. Most computer 
administrators have installed controls 
to safeguard their installations and data 
files, but are those steps adequate under 
the demands of privacy legislation?
Illegal use of computer credit data 
was the subject of a December 29, 1976 
consent order of the FTC against collec­
tion practices of a debt-collection sub­
sidiary of Diners Club, Inc. The sub­
sidiary, National Account Systems, Inc. 
was accused of illegally tapping com­
puter banks of credit information and 
using the data to harass debtors. The 
company was accused of abusing 
telephone code numbers to effectively 
steal information about debtors from 
computer data banks operated not for 
bill collection but for insurance com­
panies and credit institutions. NAS 
agencies, using unauthorized code 
numbers, told the computer companies 
that they had subscribed to the credit in­
formation.
In the order the government served 
notice to the bill collectors of America 
that it no longer will tolerate strong-arm 
tactics or unauthorized use of computer 
information about debtors. Some view 
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differ between investigators 
due to different attitudes and 
procedures
the order as a landmark case because of 
its significance in the area of privacy of 
consumers. It is the first time that the 
FTC has issued an order involving 
violation of the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act, which attempts to govern the use of 
“the big computer in the sky.” It is also 
the first time it has issued an order 
against anyone for obtaining informa­
tion under false pretenses. Under its 
statutory authority the FTC can apply 
judgments against a single respondent 
to those throughout a particular in­
dustry: thus all debt collection services 
must heed the standards contained in 
the consent order.
Decisions regarding internal security 
practices are completely up to manage­
ment. Thus, management must decide 
how much security is required. How 
much security is needed to guard against 
the loss or misuse of data, for the day-to- 
day operations of the system, and 
against the unusual case that cannot be 
anticipated nor identified in advance? 
Should HR 1984 have been enacted as 
drafted, any person who violated that 
Act would have been liable for the ac­
tual damages sustained by the data sub­
ject, punitive damages where ap­
propriate, and court costs. Further­
more, violations might be interpreted to 
include “insufficient” data integrity and 
security. How far should an organiza­
tion go toward enhancing its data in­
tegrity and security practices? Canning 
suggests six possible alternative ap­
proaches to bring the threat of lawsuits 
within acceptable bounds:
1. Make no changes. With this ap­
proach, management decides that 
the present data integrity and 
security practices are adequate, 
and that no enhancements 
probably will be needed. This ap­
proach involves the least ad­
ditional cost for data integrity 
and security and probably has the 
least credibility in the event that 
law suits are brought under the 
privacy act.
2. “Prudent man” principle. Under 
this approach, the organization 
makes a threat analysis and risk 
analysis concerning the personal 
data in its files. Once the threats 
and risks have been identified, the 
decision would be made on what 
to do and what not to do on the 
basis of what the “prudent man” 
who is concerned about protec­
ting his own property would do. 
To what extent the courts would 
side with the “prudent man” 
decisions is debatable.
3. Decision algorithms. This ap­
proach is similar to the “prudent 
man” approach except that for­
malized, quantitative methods 
are developed for making the 
decisions on what to do and what 
not to do. These methods would 
probably use the cost/benefit ap­
proach. A short-coming of this 
approach is that the decision of 
which method to use would be 
subjective, dependent upon the 
opinions of a small number of 
people. How much weight these 
opinions would carry in court is 
also a matter of conjecture.
4. Accreditation of installation. 
This approach requires that some 
independent agency, governmen­
tal or private, develop standards 
for data integrity and security 
practices. No such standards 
presently exist. The agency 
should probably represent the 
federal government and the 
industry-wide computer field. A 
data norm might be developed 
that would consist of general 
principles, standards that support 
and define these principles, and 
guidelines that explain and give 
practical examples of applying 
the standards. The agency would 
also develop and apply formal ac­
creditation methods. With ac­
creditation and standards which 
are professionally developed and 
nationally applied, the courts 
might still rule in favor of the 
plaintiffs, but it would appear less 
likely than in the case of the “pru­
dent man” principle.
5. Certification of the installation.
As with accreditation, the cer­
tification of computer centers 
would involve the development of 
standards. Authorized in­
dividuals or organizations would 
inspect data centers and certify 
(or fail to certify) that the centers 
met the standards. The model 
might be that of CPAs who per­
form audits and give an opinion 
on the financial statements. Cer­
tification differs from accredita­
tion in that the certifying in­
dividual or organization would 
have a legal responsibility. Of 
course there is no guarantee that 
standards of data integrity and 
security would not be challenged 
in court, but it appears likely that 
the courts would usually side in 
favor of the standards.
6. Licensing of the installation. 
Control by licensing would 
provide that personal data could 
neither be collected nor main­
tained unless the organization ob­
tained a license from the govern­
ment. A license would be granted 
only if the organization agreed to 
meet standards of integrity and 
security. Obviously, the license 
could also be withdrawn. Such 
licensing is not being considered 
in the U.S., but Sweden requires 
that all maintainers of mecha­
nized files of personal informa­
tion must be licensed.
The Costs of Privacy
Data processing officials no longer 
wonder whether their work will be 
affected by privacy legislation, but how 
to deal with the controls that are certain 
to be imposed. Since more than 125 bills 
to protect privacy are pending, one must 
conclude that after the question, “What 
will my company have to do to com­
ply?”, comes another question, “How 
much will it cost?” There will no doubt 
be high conversion costs in changing 
present systems to systems that would 
comply with legislation and legally 
protect organizations.
A major contribution to the privacy 
conversion cost figures will arise from 
the requirements dealing with the 
physical security of data. A second ma­
jor cost will be associated with training 
the operators and users of the system in 
privacy-oriented procedures. It is 
sometimes surprising to discover how 
many individuals have access to a 
system and therefore must be given the 
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special training. Many of the users of a 
systems may not be employees of the 
organization operating the system. This 
raises important questions about who 
should give the training, who should pay 
for the training, and who should be 
responsible for enforcing the training re­
quirements at each facility.
The computer programming needed 
to develop some of the capabilities to 
satisfy the legislation will also be signifi­
cant. Goldstein estimates that in some 
cases it accounts for as much as one- 
third of the total conversion costs. Once 
the conversion is completed, the ad­
ditional costs will not cease, expecially if 
the major impact of a change involves 
people. The critical costs are executive 
and clerical time, assuming that the pre­
sent computer installation has the 
capability of handling the additional 
work load.
The 1974 Act and most of the pro­
posed legislation includes requirements 
that all personal data be maintained 
in an adequate state of accuracy and 
timeliness. A fraction of the data in 
systems will become obsolete each year 
and must be deleted. Goldstein es­
timates this to be approximately 10 
percent, which would require clerical 
costs that might run from 26 to 45 per­
cent of the total annual privacy cost. 
Complaints about an individual’s 
record would probably be handled by an 
administrator in a hearing process. Such 
a formal process could prove costly in 
terms of administrative work load, 
assuming that the volume of complaints 
is at an annual rate of .2 percent of the 
number of records in the system.
In summary, it appears that it will be 
quite expensive to meet the privacy re­
quirements of proposed legislation. 
Some organizations may discontinue 
their installations, while others may 
pass part of their increased costs on to 
others. Some cost reductions might be 
realized from the further automation of 
procedures.
Actions of the Accounting Profession
The accounting profession is aware of 
the potential impact of pending legisla­
tion on all compilers and users of infor­
mation. In the Spring of 1976 the In­
stitute appointed a Special Committee 
of Privacy Legislation. Essentially, the 
committee is charged with monitoring 
and analyzing proposed privacy legisla­
tion as to how it may affect Institute 
members and their clients’ data systems. 
At the annual AICPA meeting in Oc­
tober, 1976, the chairman of the special 
committee reported that the current 
status of the accountant’s role in privacy 
legislation is in flux, but that the com­
mittee was working on a response to the 
Federal Privacy Protection Commis­
sion with which the accountants can 
live. At this writing the contents of that 
response have not been publicized.
Congressman Goldwater appeared as 
the keynote speaker before the Annual 
AICPA Conference on Computers and 
Information Systems held in 
Philadelphia in May, 1976. He told of 
the continuous invasion of privacy by 
governmental and private organizations 
and how the bill grew out of the in­
creasing concern of citizens over the in­
vasion of what may be considered their 
inalienable rights. Those rights given by 
the fourth amendment to the Constitu­
tion are:
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated,
Businesses as well as CPA firms will 
be involved in implementing any legisla­
tion that passes, through improved data 
security and controlled accessibility. 
One principal area of concern is per­
sonnel administration — particularly 
accessibility to personal information 
and the uses to which that data can be 
applied. An example of the improper 
use of such personal information was 
given by a guest psychiatrist on a mor­
ning TV program in early 1976 concer­
ning the bad experience of one of his 
patients. This patient came to him com­
plaining of a very bad nervous condition 
that she attributed to the unkind words 
and actions of fellow employees at her 
place of employment. The psychiatrist 
diagnosed the condition as being a type 
of schizophrenia although the patient 
was not told the specific diagnosis. Her 
first medical insurance claim was filed 
with the insurance company which 
forwarded the data to her place of 
employment, where it was entered in the 
personnel data bank. The first morning 
of her return to work she was greeted by 
three different co-workers with ex­
pressions of sympathy as to her illness 
with reference to the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia of which she was un­
aware. She became greatly upset, im­
mediately resigned her position, and the 
psychiatrist stated the public 
divulgence of such personal information 
as to her illness together with the con­
ditions under which it was broadcast 
had a very serious effect.
what will my company have to 
do to comply?.. .how much will 
it cost?...
Conclusion
Only the tip of the iceberg has been 
considered in this paper. In spite of such 
a limited consideration, there appears to 
be little doubt that privacy protection 
will become a part of all data systems 
that contain personal information. The 
time is at hand to discuss how the in­
tegrity and security of these systems are 
to be protected. Organizational 
planners must include plans for meeting 
these challenges and for considering the 
resulting costs. Kenneth T. Orr suggests 
that, “good privacy and security are 
simply good management” and that 
privacy will be cheaper if a firm only 
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